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Abstract 
Need for closure is a construct that influences the way people perceive social world. Need for closure reflects a preference 
towards certainty and stability, clarity and firm rules, definitive answers to questions, and an aversion to ambiguity and lack of 
control. People with high scores at the need of closure dimension of personality are prone to adopt stereotypical judgments and 
less inclined to accept diversity. This construct also correlates with the tendency to follow rules, to perseverate in old beliefs and 
to accept routines. Cognitive inhibition is a mechanism that ensures the continuous updating of information in memory. The 
general aim of this paper was to investigate a possible relation between the need of closure and people’s ability to inhibit 
unwanted information from memory, with a particular focus on stereotypical information. Cognitive inhibition has been 
investigated through the directed-forgetting paradigm and the need of closure dimension has been assessed with the Need of 
Closure Scale (NCS, Kruglanski et al., 2013). The results illustrate the difficulties to voluntary forget stereotypical information 
for all the participants included in the study group.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Stereotypes are socio-cognitive representations that give an illusion of order and predictability in the social 
world. They are organized sets of knowledge about a group or a social category. A large amount of studies 
demonstrate that, once constituted, they influence: information seeking and selection processes in attention, 
allocation of cognitive resources, organization, integration and mnesic availability of semantically related 
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information, social judgments, attitudes and social behavior (Fiske, 1998; Bodenhausen, 1988; Cameron & Trope, 
2004). 
In a long tradition in social psychology, stereotypical thinking has been considered a habitual and almost 
unavoidable phenomenon of every-day social life (Allport, 1954; a review in Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2001). A 
large amount of research illustrates how easily stereotypes can be activated in the presence of a triggering stimulus 
(e. g. a member of a stereotyped group or a typical behavior) and then they are almost automatically applied in 
person perception, social evaluation and interpersonal behavior (Devine, 1989; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). This view 
is particularly applicable to the stereotypes frequently encountered and used in our cultural environment (such as 
those pertaining to gender and race), which become the object of a cultural conditioning process. Being inevitably 
exposed to the cultural transmission of stereotypic information during a long history of socialization which begins in 
early childhood, people automatically associate in their minds social category membership with stereotypic 
characteristics (Devine, 1989). Under these conditions, the mere presence of a stereotyped group member or even 
the preconscious presentation of stereotypical material (e. g. related to gender, race or social occupations) is 
sufficient to prompt the cognitive activation of stereotypical concepts and to affect people’s subsequent social 
evaluations (Devine, 1989; Macrae, Stangor, & Milne, 1994).  
At the same time, many studies on mental control show how difficult, and in most cases inefficient, are the 
efforts made by the social actors to suppress the mental activation of stereotypic contents or at least to limit their 
influence on future judgments. According to experimental data, there are enough situations when people’s attempts 
to suppress stereotypic thoughts lead to counter-intentional or ironic effects (Wegner, 1994; Wegner & Wenzlaff, 
1996; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994; Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1998). For example, in a 
famous experiment conducted by Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne and Jetten (1994), the authors found that even 
though participants were able to control the intrusion of stereotypic content for a brief period of time, they were not 
able to prevent its influence on their subsequent behavior. Concretely, participants who received a picture of a 
skinhead and were asked to describe a typical day of his life avoiding the stereotypic thoughts about this social 
category exhibited fewer stereotypical thoughts in their written descriptions compared with the controls (non-
involved in thought suppression). However, when told that they were going to meet a skinhead, the participants in 
the suppression condition sat significantly further away from the seat presumptively occupied earlier by such an 
individual. Several years later, Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Wheeler (1996) and Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, 
& Ford (1997) showed in a series of experiments that stereotype suppression was an effortful and resource consuming 
process, and for this reason it was inefficient and led to counter-intentional errors under stress, under time pressure 
or when the cognitive resources were constrained.  
This “orthodox wisdom” (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2001) on stereotypical thinking as being unavoidable has 
been continuously challenged in recent years. An important amount of data argues today for a “conditional 
automaticy” of categorical person perception (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2001). Recent research shows that 
stereotype activation and stereotype application are not fully automatic processes, being mediated (conditioned) by a 
number of factors. A brief literature review reveals that: stereotype activation and application are constrained by the 
availability of cognitive resources people’s actual interests and processing objectives; self-esteem (low self-esteem 
facilitates stereotype activation and application), motivation to respond without prejudice (internal motivation to 
respond without prejudice reduces the probability of stereotype activation and application); egalitarian beliefs; social 
approval needs; adverse attitudes, social context and affective states (e.g. Fiske, 1998; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2001; 
Devine, 2001). 
In general, the various influences on stereotype activation and application were more thoroughly investigated 
by researchers, compared with the factors that potentially moderate people’s abilities to control the influence of 
activated stereotypes in social judgments. Several studies have shown that stereotype suppression can be efficient 
given some particular conditions. According to available experimental data, people are able to suppress stereotypic 
information when: they use specific strategies of distraction and refocusing of attention, they use mental practice, 
they use a precise formulation of intentions, or when they are strongly motivated to avoid prejudice (e.g. Devine & 
Monteith, 1999; Wenzlaff & Bates, 2000). In addition, Araya, Akrami, Ekehammar, & Hedlund (2002) have 
shown that the impact of activated stereotypes on subsequent judgments is attenuated in the presence of contextual 
cues that prompt the social perceiver to exercise self-control.    
Empirical evidence suggest that cognitive closure may enhance peoples’ preference for firm rules and social 
order, thus, those people high in cognitive closure reject diversity, divergent opinions or ideas, and they are inclined 
toward stereotypes and prejudice. Several authors have shown that people with elevated need of closure are more 
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likely to adopt conservative values, to reject the behaviors that are not conform with the group norms, to exclude the 
group members with diverse attitudes, to demonstrate a strong bias toward they own group and to manifest hostile 
attitudes and prejudice toward the others (e. g. Van Hiel, Pandelaere & Duriez, 2004; Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti 
& De Grada, 2006). In a study published by Dijksterhuis et al. (1996) participants high in dispositional need for 
closure recalled relatively more stereotype-consistent information in an impression formation task, while subjects 
low in need for closure recalled more inconsistent information. 
The directed forgetting paradigm has been commonly used for studying cognitive inhibition processes in 
various experimental settings (Golding & MacLeod, 1998). Directed forgetting studies show that, when they are 
instructed and motivated to suppress (forget) certain information, people are able to activate inhibitory mechanisms that 
may lead to the intended result. However, this is not the always the case if the to-be-forgotten information is stereotypic 
for example, Macrae Bodenhausen, Milne and Ford. (1997) and Araya (2003) have shown that intentional forgetting 
is inefficient for the stereotype-congruent words under cognitive load. When people have enough available cognitive 
resources, stereotype-congruent information can be voluntarily forgotten, but this effortful and resource consuming 
activity affects people’s performance in remembering the other information that was also presented (to-be-
remembered information).  
Starting from the premise that stereotype suppression is moderated by a number of individual and contextual 
factors, the aim of this study is to investigate the potential influence of one of them – the need of closure – on the 
directed-forgetting of stereotypic and counter-stereotypic information. The investigated stereotypes are gender 
stereotypes (feminine vs. masculine). 
     
2. The directed-forgetting study: stereotypes, need for closure and cognitive inhibition 
The purpose of this experiment is to investigate the presence of a possible influence of cognitive closure on 
the people’s abilities to voluntary inhibit stereotypical information. The experimental paradigm I used to study 
cognitive inhibition is directed forgetting, list procedure. The hypotheses are that the need of closure influences the 
people’s abilities to voluntary inhibit stereotypical information in two ways: 1. Participants with low cognitive closure 
have increased abilities to voluntary inhibit stereotype-congruent information, illustrated by a significant directed-
forgetting effect for this information. 2. Directed-forgetting effects are insignificant for stereotype-congruent and for 
stereotype-incongruent information for the participants scoring high on cognitive closure.  
 
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Participants  
227 students from various departments of the University of Alba Iulia, all men, with a mean age of 19.1 (range 
18-34) were included in the experiment.  
 
2.1.2. Design  
The study had a 3 (Prime: men vs. woman vs. no prime) X 2 (Instruction: forget vs. remember) X 2 (Word type: 
stereotype-congruent vs. stereotype-incongruent) mixed design, with repeated measures on the last factor. The 
results were analyzed distinctly, for the participants with high need of closure scores and for those with low scores.   
 
2.1.3. Material 
Two sets (lists) of 15 words each were used. In the first list, 10 words corresponded  to the gender category 
“man”, and 5 words corresponded to the opposite gender category (“woman”). 5 words from each list were non-
stereotypical (filter) words selected from the Rey Memory Test (Rey, 1964). The masculine and feminine attributes 
were selected in the following manner. First, I selected a list of 40 behavioral traits, 20 for women and 20 for men, 
the most frequently mentioned in literature (Balica, Fartuşnic, Horga, Jigău, & Voinea, 2004; Curic, 2004). In 
general, studies conducted in the U.S. and Europe associate masculinity with an instrumental dimension of 
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personality (men being described as more independent, assertive, determined, courageous, dominant) and femininity 
with an expressive-emotional dimension (women being described as more affectionate, caring, sensitive, loving, 
empathetic, gentle). I presented the initial list of 40 words to each participant, who was asked to rate the typicality of 
each attribute for the gender categories on a 10-point scale. More specifically, participants had two distinct tasks: to 
rate the typicality of traits for women, and then to rate the typicality of the same traits (presented in a new list) for 
men. The order of traits was different between lists and so was their grammatical gender, which was congruent with 
the gender category. I selected in each case 10 stereotypical (masculine) words and 10 counter-stereotypical 
(feminine) words, those with the highest differential scores (for example, if a trait like ‘dominant’ is rated with 9 for 
men and 5 for women, the differential score is (9/5)/9. For every participant, I tried to match the length of the words 
on the two lists.  
 
2.1.4. Procedure 
In order to evaluate their need of closure dimension, all participants initially completed a self-assessment 
scale: The Need of Closure Scale (NCS, Kruglanski et al., 2013). The scale consists of 47 statements, participants 
being asked to indicate the degree of their agreement with each statement on a 6-point Likert-type scale (1 means 
total disagreement and 6 total agreements). The total score is calculated by adding the scores of each statement, with 
the exception of 5 lie items and other 16 items which are reversely scored. The total scores are situated between –54 
and +236, high values indicating a high need for closure.     
The experiment was conducted in three stages: stereotype activation, learning phase and recall task.   
Stereotype activation was made through category priming (a set of masculine, feminine or neutral images 
were presented). In the directed-forgetting task, all participants were asked to memorize the first list of 15 words. 
After the list was presented, half of participants from each prime condition were told to forget these words (with the 
explanation that the words had been given only for practice; in order to obtain additional motivation, the subjects 
were told they would have better results on the final memory test if they forgot these ‘practice’ words which could 
produce mnesic interference with those from the ‘real’ list). The remaining half of participants in the two prime 
conditions received no such instruction. The second list of 15 words was presented to all participants, who were 
instructed to remember the list of words. Finally, all participants were asked to recall the studied words, including 
those which some of them had been instructed to forget. Between the word presentation and the memory test, I 
included a 2-minute distracter task. The directed forgetting effect was calculated as the difference between the 
correctly recalled words from the two lists (the time limit for free recalling was 4 minutes).  
2.2. Results 
The results obtained in the directed forgetting task by the participants with low need of closure (N = 121, 
scores less than 130 at the NC Scale) were compared with the results obtained by the participants with high need of 
closure (N = 106, scores higher than 160).   
In the case of participants with low need for closure scores (≤ 130), ANOVA calculation indicate a significant 
effect of the main independent variable instruction (forget vs. remember): F(1, 115) = 5.40, p = 0.022 on the 
dependent variable represented by the number of correctly recalled words from the two lists (the filter-words were 
excluded). In the case of participants with low need for closure scores (≤ 160), ANOVA indicate a significant effect 
of the main variable instruction (forget vs. remember): F(1, 100) = 7.25, p = 0.008 and a significant effect of the  
main variable prime (men vs. woman vs. no prime): F(2, 100) = 4.07, p = 0.02.   
For an in-depth analysis of these interactions I performed a closer examination of the significance of the 
directed forgetting effects, in the case of each of the two contrast groups (with low need for closure scores and with 
high scores respectively), for each primed gender category (masculine, feminine or no prime) and for each category 
of words (stereotype-congruent and stereotype-incongruent) (Table 1).   
In the case of the participants with low need for closure scores, when the masculine stereotype was primed, 
the one-way ANOVA indicate an insignificant effect of the directed-forgetting instruction on the participants’ 
performances in remembering the words from the list 1 (words that, in this experimental condition, are stereotype-
congruent): F(1, 36) = 1.35, p = 0.25. When the feminine stereotype was primed, the results are similar, the effect of 
the directed-forgetting instruction on the participants’ performances in remembering the words from the list 1 
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(words that, this time, are stereotype-incongruent) being also insignificant: F(1, 38) = 0.27, p = 0.6. Thus, in the 
particular case of the people scoring low on the need for closure dimension, directed-forgetting seems to be 
inefficient for the stereotypical information as well as for the counter-stereotypical. In the no-prime control 
condition, the directed-forgetting effect is significant: the participants instructed to remember both lists recalled a 
higher number of words from the first list, as compared with the participants instructed to forget them: t(41) = 3.05, 
p = 0.014.     
 
Table 1. The mean values of correctly recalled to-be-forgotten (list 1) and to-be-remembered words (list 2) by their 
stereotypical connotation (stereotype-congruent vs. stereotype-incongruent)  
 
 
Directed-forgetting task  
list procedure 
List 1 
Words related to the 
masculine stereotype  
List 2 
Words related to the 
feminine stereotype 
 




2.66 (1.18) * 
3.23 (1.78) ** 
4.11 (1.18) * 
3.58 (1.46) ** 
Directed-forgetting 
instruction absent  
(simple memorisation task)  
3.25 (1.80) * 
4.16 (1.68) ** 
3.60 (1.69) * 
3.58 (1.46) ** 




3.10 (1.62) * 
3.27 (1.60) ** 
4.05 (2.24) * 
4.11 (1.36) ** 
Directed-forgetting 
instruction absent (simple 
memorisation task)  
3.38 (1.71) * 
3.44 (1.14) ** 
3.90 (1.09) * 
3.55 (1.33) ** 
No-prime  Directed-forgetting 
instruction present 
2.19 (1.32) * 
2.17 (1.06) ** 
4.23 (1.60) * 
4.76 (1.78) ** 
Directed-forgetting 
instruction absent (simple 
memorisation task)  
3.59 (1.65) * 
3.22 (1.51) ** 
4.04 (1.17) * 
3.66 (1.20) ** 
* low need for closure               ** high need for closure 
 
In the case of the participants with high need for closure scores, when the masculine stereotype was primed, 
the one-way ANOVA indicate an insignificant effect of the directed-forgetting instruction on the participants’ 
performances in remembering the words from the list 1 (stereotype-congruent): F(1, 33) = 1.23, p = 0.12. When the 
feminine stereotype was primed, the effect of the directed-forgetting instruction on the participants’ performances in 
remembering the words from the list 1 (stereotype-incongruent) is also insignificant: F(1, 34) = 0.35, p = 0.72. Thus, 
in the case of the people scoring low on the need for closure dimension, directed-forgetting seems to be inefficient 
for the stereotypical information as well as for the counter-stereotypical. In the no-prime control condition, the 
directed-forgetting effect is significant: the participants instructed to remember both lists recalled a higher number 
of words from the first list, as compared with the participants instructed to forget them: t(33) = 2.34, p = 0.025. The 
forgetting performance of the words from the first list is associated with the benefit of a better recall of the words 
from the second one: t(33) = 1.91, p = 0.064.       
2.3. Conclusions 
A large amount of research indicates the occurrence of significant directed forgetting effects of semantically 
unrelated and emotionally neutral words in the general population (Golding & MacLeod, 1998). These results show 
that memory control is difficult for stereotype-congruent as well as for stereotype-incongruent information. The 
initial hypotheses regarding a mediating influence of the need for closure on the cognitive inhibition abilities for the 
stereotypical information were not confirmed by the present data.   
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